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 Throughout his Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead defines the history of 
civilization as the progressive formation of the idea of human dignity, just like a “tiny 
glow announcing the dawn of a new life order”1. According to Patočka, the role of what 
he calls the “moderate supercivilization” consists in the creation of goods that can be 
universalized to all human beings. He insists particularly on two core values: scientific 
truth and human liberty. Both configure the “recognition of man by man as equal”2. 
Even if he does not talk explicitly about human dignity, Patočka refers to this notion as 
the central value of western civilization. Also, and from an historical perspective, Béjar 
thinks that the “greatest revolution of modernity is the affirmation of the individual as 
the deciding and unquestionable center of the collective organization”3. With these three 
preliminary references, it might be possible to think about the idea of human dignity. 
On one hand, this notion would be the mirror of a moral progress: social and political 
organizations would find their “raison d’être” in the respect of the value of human 
being. On the other hand, human dignity would match with a specific historical period 
(Modernity) and a particular civilization (the Western world). Indeed, this culture has 
formulated morally and philosophically this notion, that has integrated in the XXth 
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century the national and international legal orders as the base of human rights. For 
Peces-Barba, human dignity is the “grounding of the public ethic of modernity, like a 
prius of the political and legal values”4. As a consequence, the purpose of human rights 
is the defense and the development of this ideal5. In the XIXth century, Von Humboldt 
defined human dignity as the “internal value” of man; it is the moral value that becomes 
the “universal criteria” of human relationships. It would come from the presence of the 
“mark of humanity” in each individual6. Nowadays, some try to understand the legal 
limits of this concept; for instance, bioethics has opened brand new perspectives for its 
application7. However, the notion has brought up many questions related to the 
ambiguities of its meaning and the inconsistency of separating the “human” to the 
“animal”8. In addition, others thinkers have tried to understand its historical and 
philosophical background9. This paper will try to contribute to this perspective. Human 
dignity is indeed the “radical nucleus from where has been built the philosophical 
construction of human rights”10. Also, Lukes defines human dignity as the “moral (or 
religious) axiom” that recognizes a supreme and intrinsic value in the individual11. The 
concept of the “individual” is indeed important if we want to understand the background 
of human dignity. Thus, Dumont points out: “When we speak of man as an individual, 
we designate two concepts at once: an object out there, and a value. Comparison obliges 
us to distinguish analytically these two aspects: one, the empirical subject of speech, 
thought, and will, the individual sample of mankind, as found in all societies; and, two, 
the independent, autonomous, and thus essentially nonsocial moral being, who carries 
our paramount values and is found primarily in our modern ideology of man and 
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society. Where the individual is a paramount value I speak of individualism. In the 
opposite case, where the paramount value lies in society as a whole, I speak of 
holism”12. Dumont implicitly refers to human dignity as the central value that has 
shaped individualism. He also raises another question that could perfectly apply to the 
historical construction of human dignity: “The problem of the origins of individualism 
consists grosso modo in knowing how and from which type of holist societies, could be 
developed a new type that contradicted essentially the common conception. How this 
transition could have been possible? How can we imagine a transition between those 
two opposite universes, those two irreconcilable ideologies?”13. In others words, 
Dumont asks himself how individualism can stem from holism. The French 
anthropologist thinks this incompatibility can be solved considering history: he detects a 
“slow transformation” from a kind of individualism to another that comes to the modern 
individual, as a subject who is “self-sufficient” in the social world14. Thus, Dumont 
defines contemporary human beings as “individuals-in-the-world”, that is to say, 
mundane and autonomous individuals. This kind of individualism has appeared first in 
holist and traditional societies. It comes from a basic kind of individualism, described as 
“Outworldy individuals”. Those who have incarnated this last type are the so-called 
“renouncers” in India, the figures of the pre-socratic wise man and the Christian. Those 
figures would have two common points: the “distance from the social world” and the 
“relativization of life”15. These two characteristics have generated what Dumont calls 
the “spiritual development of individual”. The latter refers to the ideals of autonomy and 
self-sufficiency. Those ideals would be the grounding of modern individualism and 
human dignity. Indeed, and following the terminology of Dumont, the “individual as a 
value”, has been built from the outworldy individual. This one is situated outside the 
established political and social organization: it is outside and beyond it. The conciliation 
and the transformation of the “outworldy individuals” into the “inwardly individuals” 
have been done slowly thanks to some processes of “adaptation to the world”. Among 
those processes, Dumont insists on the notion of the “Natural Law” defined by stoicism 
(and used afterwards by the Church) as an “indispensable instrument of adaptation”16.  
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 This analysis of Dumont can be useful to our research on human dignity. On one 
hand, if we want to understand the origins of this notion in the pre-modern ages (such as 
Antiquity), we will deal with a specific concept of the individual: an outworldly 
individual who tries to adapt his situation “in-the-world”.  In this case, the individuality 
still depends on ethical holist frameworks. The idea of an autonomous individual, 
premise of human dignity and such as we conceive it in our modern times, does not 
exist yet; it’s about to be developed. As a consequence, how is it possible to infer the 
idea of human dignity from conceptions that have not defended the autonomy of 
individuals?  
 When we talk about human dignity, we imply the “dignity of the human being”, 
that is to say, the autonomous individual holder of rights. This dimension also entails 
the concept of “equal dignity” that recognizes an absolute equality between individuals. 
This equal dignity forbids, at first, discriminations based on natural, social and cultural 
reasons; it is the ultimate value that defines human beings as equal, and it is “required in 
their real conditions of living”17. Equal dignity demands subsequently a moral attitude 
in human relationships that can be defined by the notion of “respect”.   
 The grounding of the “dignity of the human being” is traditionally linked with 
the sense of belonging of all individuals to the same human family. This membership 
involves two aspects: on one side, it is shaped by ideals of cosmopolitism that pretend 
to stimulate a “consciousness of mankind” in each individual. At the end, a common 
and human identity should prevail on the various and national identities18. On the other 
side, this common identity would come from specific human characteristics shared by 
all individuals. This construction is inherent to human dignity and allows defining a 
human identity that would be the grounding of equal dignity19. Here appears the second 
dimension of human dignity that I define as the “dignity of human nature”. This formula 
pretends to encapsulate different moral and philosophical perspectives that identify the 
superior specificities of human nature. Those ones would be the sign of their human 
identity and the grounding of their intrinsic and absolute value.  This “dignity of human 
nature” would precede consequently the “dignity of the human being”; the first one 
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would “foster” the human component of the second one20. At the same time, a tension 
could appear between these two dimensions: the autonomy recognized in the modern 
individual can go against a strict and moral definition of human nature. Taylor indicates 
that a moral consensus (religious and secular) acknowledges “some ground in human 
nature or the human predicament which makes human fit objects of respect”, but it 
cannot subscribe “with complete conviction to any particular definition” of this human 
nature21. Indeed, human dignity is the legal and ethical foundation of human rights and 
implies the recognition of an inherent autonomy in the human subject. This autonomy 
escapes from any holistic and moral considerations. The dignity of the human being 
represents the base and the horizon of the political and legal orders of the modern 
western societies. This point would come from a general rupture due to Modernity: it 
would consist in the fact that ontology is now preceded by axiology22. If we want to 
carry out a research into the historical and philosophical background of human dignity, 
we will deal with a concept whose bounds will be unclear, between ontology and 
axiology. This is the difficulty and the challenge of such an investigation. But we can 
shed light on this “tiny glow”, according to Whitehead, trying to understand how the 
dignity of the human being stems from his supposed moral autonomy. It is a value 
dissociated from any ethical idea of human nature or divinity23. However, the modern 
definition of human dignity derives from moral ideals of the “dignity of human nature” 
that lie within ethical and holist structures. In order that autonomy should be considered 
as the central value upon which human dignity has been articulated, it has been 
previously included in the parameters of the “dignity of human nature”. In other words, 
the notion of autonomy does exist in moral and holist frameworks that have celebrated 
the excellence of human nature.  
 
 To recapitulate, the modern definition of human dignity refers to the dignity of 
the human being. The latter branches out into two complementary dimensions: the 
expression and the foundation of human dignity. In the first place, the expression would 
have a double meaning. It would firstly refer to the recognition of an intrinsic and 
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absolute value in each person, considered as an autonomous individual. It would 
secondly refer to the recognition of an equal dignity between those individuals. Human 
rights represent in our present days the ultimate expression and protection of human 
dignity. In the second place, the grounding of human dignity would come from the 
membership of everyone to the human family. This membership would stem from a 
common and human identity. This second dimension is the “dignity of human nature”. 
There is no clear separation between this dimension and the first one: the basis of the 
“dignity of the human being” seems to go back to the models of the “dignity of human 
nature”. This second dimension has appeared historically before the “dignity of the 
human being”, with for instance, writings upon the dignitas hominis during the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance. It has been structured during times when human person was 
not the central value of the social organization. Once again, Dumont can be useful if we 
want to solve this apparent paradox. He points out that the “individual as a value” has 
emerged in holistic societies thanks to different human figures and moral trends that 
have remove it from this holistic limits. This process of detachment could have been 
realized with the stimulation of specific faculties to human nature. More precisely, “the 
emergence of the individual as value, as a creation ex nihilo” can be explained by “the 
philosophical individualism”. Indeed, “the philosophical activity, the sustained exercise 
of rational inquiry carried out by generations of thinkers, must by itself have fostered 
individualism, because reason, universal in principle, is in practice at work through the 
particular person who exercises it”24. This quote implies that the notion of human 
dignity (the “individual as value”), comes from the stimulation of human faculties, and 
in particular, reason. This one should have been previously identified as a human 
capacity. Reason should have been described as proper to human nature. The individual 
is defined as the holder of the characteristics of human nature and reason represents its 
supreme manifestation. In others words, “individual as value” stems from “human 
nature as value”; the link between those two aspects has been built by the celebration of 
human reason. The very notion of “person” comes from the “specifically human 
individuality”, and its dignity has been shaped by the recognition of an autonomous and 
rational human nature25. Human nature has been enhanced by the exaltation of the 
characteristics defining all humans. That is why it is impossible to maintain a rigid 
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position towards history. On one hand, we should not modernize societies and ways of 
thinking, which have emerged in holistic frameworks. On the other, we should not 
defend a hermetic approach, celebrating the modernity of the human subject 
(autonomous and holder of rights) in opposition with the past history.  
 Also, we should not fall into the error of defending a progressive evolution of 
human dignity. It would imply a simplistic vision of history that does not match with 
the complexity of this notion. The history of this ideal involves numerous factors and 
actors; it has been a history of struggles, conflicts and permanent discontinuities. 
Studying human dignity through philosophy will not necessarily take into account 
others historical and ideological points of view. Nevertheless, this field represents 
interesting perspectives. We have seen with Dumont that the “philosophical 
individualism” represents the base of the “individual as value”. The philosopher has 
been a classical figure that has been conscious of his individual dignity. He excludes 
himself from the mundane world, activating the rational and moral capacities of human 
nature. I think it could be interesting to go deeper into this idea raised by Dumont, 
considering not only the historical personality of the philosopher but also the 
philosophical corpus. Human dignity is not only a legal and political notion but also 
(and first) a philosophical concept. The bond that joins both dimensions is precisely its 
ethical background. Baechler indicates that behind human dignity exists a profound 
philosophical and ethical reflexion that has lead to recognize a value in the human 
being, considered as an ideal26. This perspective allows us to understand maybe the 
vagueness of its meaning, and to contrast it with some researches that caricature the 
concept of human dignity to an exclusive theological basis27.  
  
 We should underline another point if we want to investigate the historical 
evolution of human dignity. The pre-modern origins of this concept come from moral 
conceptions that have defended the excellence of human nature (or what I call the 
“dignity of human nature”). Those conceptions were structured on various dualisms. 
Reason was defined as the only element that could reveal a dignity in the individual. At 
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the same time, only the human soul could hold this faculty. As a consequence, human 
body was considered as a limit to the exercise of reason; man could find its dignity if 
only he was able to overcome his mundane passions and if he could activate reason 
inside his soul. The latter was the proof of the connection between human and deity. It 
also shows the singularity of human species in relation with animals. In other words, the 
rational soul was the base of the “dignity of human nature”. It even legitimates the 
domination of men on the rest of nature. There was a dualism between body and soul, 
human and animal, and between the spiritual reality and the mundane world. Individuals 
should have felt their dignity as a transcendental value, because they belonged to a 
divine community. The other relevant point is that this dualism between body and soul 
was also the ethical framework to legitimate slavery, that is to say, the very negation of 
equal dignity. Some individuals were not able to control the urges of their bodies and to 
reach a moral autonomy. They were not able to “update” the “dignity of human nature”. 
Therefore, and even for their own good, they had to accept the domination of those who 
were able to be rationally autonomous. Thus, the models of the “dignity of human 
nature” were based on moral ideals of human excellence that represented ethical barriers 
to the notion of equal dignity.  For instance, women could not participate in this 
excellence of human nature; they could not control the urges of their bodies, their 
emotions dominated their reason, and they were not able to participate in the political 
sphere. In the pre-modern times, the construction of the “dignity of human nature” 
implied a process of exclusion of various individuals from the circle of humanity: 
animals, foreigners, women, children and elders. Some individuals had to be previously 
dehumanized in order to justify their political and social exclusion. In the classical ages 
for instance, the idea of “dignity” depended on the identity of the Athenian or the 
Roman citizen. Only one circle of individuals represented the ideals of human nature, 
while the other human groups could not reach this excellence28. Nevertheless, this idea 
of human dignity is deeply rooted in the philosophical and historical relations between 
the subject and truth29.  
 
 Finally, the notion of human dignity might be one of the pillars of the European 
identity. It does not mean of course, that this notion has not appeared in other cultures. 
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It is just a value that has been shaped and transformed by many European and humanist 
thinkers throughout the ages. In the introduction of the Crisis of the European culture, 
Hazard talks about the “distinctive beauty” of “our human brothers” who have looked 
for their ways reaching unknown destinies. Thus: “if the distinctive feature of Europe 
(…) is to never be content with something, and to start all over again its search for the 
truth, there is in this effort a distressing beauty. Studying the birth of ideas, or at least, 
their metamorphosis (…) one is convinced that it is not the material forces but the moral 
and philosophical ones that guide and dominate human life”30. In a same perspective, 
Sloterdijk imagines the direction of the European destiny, beyond of what he calls the 
“Empire’s transfer”. He points outs that the very name of “Europa” refers to “a part of 
the world where the reflexion upon the truth and the quality of life is unquestionably 
singular. Even in modern times, Europeans have still believed that what is fair and 
worthy in the human being have, in a long term, a right to success. It is not a 
coincidence if they bring, in their concepts of science, democracy, human rights and art, 
something of their characteristic idea of the truth. These concepts participate in the 
European challenge launched to the human species: to create forms of life that consider 
man as a creature essentially profound and able of greatness. Europeans, as long as they 
produce some efforts, are in consequence, rebels against misery (…). Unlike anyone 
else, they suffer from the misery that consists in having no project against misery. The 
European despairs are much more dangerous than the despairs of people from other 
cultures. One says wisely that Europe was the mother of revolutions; a deeper definition 
would describe Europe as the home against human misery (…).  The right of Europe is 
her great declaration for the human being”31. The idea of human dignity would be an 
important contribution of Europe to the Western civilization. According to Sloterdijk, 
the European culture could be defined by its opposition against ideologies that deny any 
dignity in the human being. Europe would create new spaces and activities in 
accordance with the expressions of human dignity. This notion would historically 
propel the European identity; it would be “mythical-engine” of the European 
consciousness32.  
 This perspective should be developed: on one hand, this “mythical engine” of 
human dignity has suffered (and it still suffers) many breakdowns. On the other hand, it 
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has been fed with a fuel that does not come exclusively from the European ground. That 
is why we have to take into account the idea of Patočka who, in 1970, urged to consider 
seriously all the cultural (and) European traditions:  
 
 “The generalization of Europe will lead necessarily to a debate on the 
 cultural traditions that offer to the idea of Europe an empirical and indispensable 
 base. Until now, those traditions have been considered as dead and insignificant, 
 but we will have to take them into account seriously. Indeed, Europe finds 
 nowhere a tabula rasa, but a ground already ploughed, a world already shaped 
 (…)”33.   
  
 Even if the concept of human dignity might have been discovered by a European 
and humanist tradition, it is open to other cultures that may have expanded its 
dimensions, celebrating the autonomy of individuals and their equal dignity.  
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